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The Future of Offshore Tax Havens
Taylor Morgan Hoffiman*

Recently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") issued a report targeting "harmful tax regimes"-preferential, low tax
regimes that are primarily tailored to rap into the tax bases of other countries. The
report, Towards Global Tax Cooperation:Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmfld
Tax Practices, ("Towards Global Tax Cooperation"),' identified a list of tax practices the
OECD deemed harmful, such as "ring-fencing" (where foreign customers are subject
to rules different than those applied to citizens which encourages the establishment of
foreign entities with no substantial activities), a lack of transparency, and the absence
of information exchange regarding tax practices. The OECD then released a second
report, Frameworkfor a Collective Memnorandum of Understanding on Elimninating Harmfl
Tax Practices ("Tramework"). 2 This report listed the OECD's objections to the policies
of harmful tax regimes and provided a host of scheduled remedies, which presumably
would be backed by the threat of sanctions detailed in Towards Global Tax Cooperation.
Not surprisingly, the Commonwealth countries were among those identified as
having harmful tax practices. In January 2001, the OECD met with the
Commonwealth countries and other tax haven regimes to negotiate a "mutually
acceptable" tax policy. What took place both during and after these negotiations is
the subject of this Development.
After highlighting the issues at stake and addressing the January negotiations,
this Development will consider how two Caribbean countries, the Bahamas and
Bermuda, have reacted to the OECD's proposals. These countries provide a good
illustration of contrasting positions: while the OECD deemed the Bahamas "noncooperating," Bermuda gave advance commitment to the OECD proposals. Yet both
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have essentially adopted the core principles of the OECD proposals that eventually
emerged from the January 2001 negotiations. Next, the essay will discuss the role of
the Bush administration in shaping the accepted OECD proposals. Finally, in
considering the future of tax havens, this Development will conclude that the
compromised position advanced by the Bush administration was merely an
affirmation of the course of reform already begun by the offshore tax haven regimes
themselves.
I. THE NEGOTIATIONS

Towards Global Tax Cooperation and Framework provide the foundation for solving
what the OECD considers to be the problems caused by harmful tax practices. As a
result, they also serve as the foundation for ongoing negotiations between the OECD
and the countries identified as engaging in such practices. However, the road to the
negotiation table has been obstructed by a number of issues, including traditional
North-South tensions, the unilateral approach taken by the OECD, and attendant
sovereignty concerns (namely, the right to determine internal policies of taxation).
As a result, the January 2001 tax policy negotiations between the OECD and tax
havens were less than amiable. However, the OECD agreed to forego its rigid
implementation schedule by withdrawing its Framework in exchange for proceeding
with the reform initiative on the basic principles set forth by the OECDtransparency, non-discrimination, and effective exchange of information. A task force
was set up to find a mutually acceptable political process that would transform the
OECD principles into commitments and to continue the dialogue begun at the
January meeting. The OECD gave the "offending' nations until July 31, 2001 to
cooperate with its program or face economic repercussions.
Under pressure from the new Bush administration, modifications were made to
the original plan at the meeting of G-7 Finance Ministers in July. Specifically, the
Finance Ministers agreed that coordinated sanctions or "defensive measures" would
become effective for uncooperative tax haven jurisdictions no earlier than they would
for similarly situated OECD member countries; the July compliance deadline would
be pushed back to November 30, 2001; and the "no substantial activities" criterion
would no longer be applied to identify a jurisdiction as "uncooperative." A
spokesperson for the OECD said that OECD member countries would not
implement sanctions until April 2003 at the earliest.
II. THE STAKES
With British encouragement, many Caribbean countries developed financial
industries when they gained their independence in the 1960s. These financial
industries provided a means of economic diversification in times of falling
commodities prices and a highly competitive tourist market. These countries
employed tax regimes with no or only nominal rates and strict secrecy rules. As a
VoV.
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result, their financial markets flourished. Indeed, in terms of the size of its capital
market, the Cayman Islands is the fifth largest in the world, behind New York,
London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. From 1985 to 1994 the value of investments put
into the low tax jurisdictions of the Caribbean and South Pacific islands grew fivefold,
to over $200 billion. Some estimates put the figure in the trillions.'
The Caribbean nations fear that the OECD plan will devastate their economies.
Indeed, some might see their Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") drop as much as 25
percent because their economies are so heavily dependent on the financial industry.
Financial services provides about one third of Barbados' government revenues.4 Some
Caribbean financiers also fear a domino effect: that troubled economies brought on by
these new regulations will invite corruption and high crime rates, which would in turn
ruin the tourist industry and force Caribbean nations to rely on foreign aid.
The OECD countries see their vital interests at stake as well. Tax haven privacy
laws make it tough for countries to tax the worldwide income and assets of their
citizens. As a result, OECD member countries, especially the high-tax regimes of
Europe, are losing a considerable amount of revenue to tax evasion. The US estimates
that it loses $70 billion annually in taxes from Americans using offshore accounts. In
addition, OECD countries worry about the over-reporting of income as international
criminals launder money in these tax havens with impunity. The Caribbean nations,
however, are quick to point out that billions of dollars in laundered money sits in New
York and London financial institutions. Regardless oflocation, money laundering is a
serious issue. International Monetary Fund Managing Director Michel Camdessus
estimates that money laundering constitutes between $800 billion and $2 trillion per
year.6 In addition to financial concerns, former Special Advisor to the Secretary of the
Treasury, William F. Wechsler, argues that US security is at stake as rogue banking
has helped
Saddam Hussein stay in power and has fueled Slobodan Milosevic's war
7
machine.

But the core issue for OECD countries in launching their campaign may have
been what they perceive as the predatory policies of tax regimes. Rather than
attracting true foreign investment, the purpose of predatory tax regimes is to siphon
off part of another country's tax base. For instance, policies in the Cayman Islands
enabled Fruit of the Loom to save almost $100 million in taxes every year by moving
its headquarters there." With a population of 35,000, the Cayman Islands has
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

James Canute, Islands HailSuccess ofEfforts on Money Laundering, Fin Times 7 Uuly 5,2001).
Daniel J. Mitchell OECD Tax ConpetitionProposa:Hil:er Taxes and /es Prvac, Tax Notes Today
24 (Nov 6,2000).
Mark Battersby, Tax Watch: 'Global Cartel'Takes tie Heat Off Tax Havens, Investment News 14 (Aug
13,2001).
William F. Wechsler, Follow the Money, 80 Foreign Aff40, 45 (Aug 2001).
Idat48.
Mitchell, Tax Notes Today at 24 (cited in note 4).
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banking assets which exceed $670 billion and is home to 570 banks and trust
companies, 2,240 mutual funds, and 45,000 offshore businesses.9 In addition, it is
estimated that more than $800 billion in US currency is held in the Cayman Islands.
Combined, the so-called tax havens account for 1.2 percent of the world population
and 3 percent of the world GDP, but 26 percent of the assets and 31 percent of the
net profits of American multinationals (though only 4.3 percent of their workers)."
The advancing technology of the Internet has made these activities considerably
easier. For example, one Internet site advertising offshore brokerage accounts in
Dominica boasts, "US stocks, bonds, options, currencies and mutual funds are
frequently bought through offshore companies because they are not liable to US
capital gains taxes."" Another brags that Dominica is "one of the best tax havens,
unbeatable for offshore company formations, offshore accounts, online banking and
asset protection in total secrecy." The site also advertises that there is no requirement to
file accounting information with any authority and that there is a complete exemption
from all local taxes, death duties, and other similar charges.
III. BERMUDA
On May 15, 2000 Bermuda contacted the OECD, pledging its advance
commitment to the OECD guidelines. Bermuda, once legendary for offshore
corruption, now possesses an established independent regulator and has been open to
new regulations. Its Premier, Jennifer Smith, has noted that "[w]e negotiate and seek
solutions that provide the maximum mutual benefits. Bermuda will continue to stand
apart as the jurisdiction for high-quality legitimate business."'3
Currently, Bermuda does not tax profits, dividends, or income (corporate or
personal). Moreover, there are no capital gains taxes, withholding taxes, or gift taxes.
International companies registered in Bermuda may apply for exemption from any
taxes on profits or income until the year 2016, should such taxes ever be assessed.
Revenues are raised from customs duties, employment taxes, hospital levies, land
taxes, and various other minor levies such as stamp duties.
With one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, and as a British
dependency, Bermuda has less to lose than the Bahamas by complying with the
OECD's proposals. In addition, many Bermudan financiers are concerned that an
unfavorable label from the OECD would do more to harm the financial industry than

9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

Wechsler, 80 Foreign Aff at 42 (cited in note 6).
Globalizationand Tax: Gimmie Shelter, Economist 15 (Jan 29, 2000).
Described in Treasury Secretary O'Neill Statement on OECD Tax Havens, Treasury News (May 10,
2001), available online at <hrrp://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/po366.htm> (visited Sept 30,
2001).
IBC Services, Inc. <http://dominica-raxhaven.com/> (visited Sept 5, 2001) (emphasis in original).
James Canute, OECD Exams Are Passed:Taxation, Fin Times 9 (May 25, 2001).
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would the new reforms. Therefore, Bermuda amiably signed on to the OECD's
proposals.
Despite fears of initial changes and irritation over the OECD's high-handed
tactics, there is a great deal of optimism in the Bermudan business community about
the reforms required by the OECD. Ray Medeiros, chairman of the Bermuda
International Business Association, said, "[U]Itimately, as we look to the future of the
global economy, it will be those jurisdictions that adopt and maintain international
standards that will be most highly regarded. These jurisdictions will by extension
inspire confidence
and continue to attract quality business, as we have experienced in
14
Bermuda."

IV. BAHAMAS
The Bahamas, in contrast to Bermuda, has been vocal in its complaints about the
OECD's actions. The Bahamas has become especially and increasingly dependent on
the offshore sector as an engine of growth. In fact, offshore finances account for 15
percent of GDP and 20 percent of government revenue." The Bahamas has 580
mutual fimds, 60 insurance companies, and 100,000 international business companies
("IBCs")-roughly one for every three Bahaman. It has $350 billion worth of assets
under management and is home to 418 banks from 36 countries.'6
Nonetheless, the Bahamas is moving away from its previous hard-line stance
against the OECD's proposals. In February 2001, the OECD singled out the
Bahamas, along with the Cayman Islands, as having adopted a pro-active approach
toward the implementation of new measures addressing the OECD's concerns.
OECD recognized the Bahamas' significant additional progress. Progress that the
OECD noted with particular satisfaction includes laws addressing banking
supervision, customer identification, information about the ownership of IBCs, and
channels for providing international cooperation at judicial and administrative levels.
However, the OECD is still not satisfied since the Bahamas has nor "enacted [or]
implemented all necessary reforms." 7
In response to continued concerns regarding Bahaman practice, major reforms
have been implemented, such as the ban of anonymous ownership of its 100,000 IBCs.
In addition, the government suspended two Bahamas-based banks-the British Bank
of Latin America and the Federal Bank-for the banks' inability to fulfill basic
14.

OECD Decision Reinforces Island's Reputation: BIBA, Bermuda Sun (june 28, 2000), available online at

<http://www.bermudsun.bm/archives/2000-06-28/03Businessl6> (risited Sept 30, 2001).
15.

Christopher Vogr, Cotninonwrealtlbcountries and OECD team up tofiht fscal corrupiun, Agence France
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Presse Gan 10, 2001).
All Havens inaStorm, Economist 70 (July 1.2000).

17.

OECD Public Statement, ProgressiveReport on Non-CcoerativeCountries anl Temitores (Feb 1.2001),
available online at <htp://www.oecd.org/medi/rlease/nvOl-lla.hm> (visited Sept 30,2001).
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banking requirements.' 8 The government has indicated that it will close any bank that
it deems to be threatening "the integrity of the international financial system."19
Government regulators also froze $9 million in assets in an offshore account held by a
man wanted in France for money laundering.'
In terms of substantive legal change, the Bahamas enacted the Central Bank of
The Bahamas Act ("Act") in 2000. The Act provides for improved bank supervision,
full cooperation on cross-border supervision of banks, enhanced cooperation between
the Central Bank and overseas regulatory authorities, as well as extensive information
gathering powers for the Central Bank. In addition, the Bahamas passed the Financial
Transactions Reporting Act, which addresses money laundering issues by imposing
restrictions on financial institutions, including the verification of the identity of
persons with whom the banks transact business. While a number of banks may end
their business relationship with the Bahamas as a result of these two acts, it is
estimated that approximately half of the managed banks will remain in the Bahamas
and comply with the new reforms, establish a physical presence, and expand
operations.2 The reforms taken have led to widespread speculation that the Bahamas
will soon join other tax havens and pledge compliance with the OECD programs.
In a sense, the emergence of globalization that helped foster the environment in
which the Bahamas could become a successful tax haven is now forcing it to adopt
international standards for banking and tax regulation. As the Executive Director of
Bahamas Financial Services Board, Barry J. Malcolm, noted, "[Als a people of reason,
we also know that if globalization is to bear positive fruit, it will dictate widespread
changes in the domestic and international arenas, especially in the area of trade."'
Neither this statement, nor those of the Bahaman Premier in regard to the various
reforms mentioned the OECD as a driving force. This is not merely due to
diplomatic maneuvers and pride. Instead, it is indicative of other forces at workmost notably, the wishes of international investors. So while it stands to lose a
number of international investors with the new regulations, the Bahamas will almost
certainly attract others through the use of internationally accepted banking and
accounting procedures. Prime Minister Ingraham's administration has focused on
economic development and job creation, through which the government seeks to
improve the country's image in the eyes of foreign investors who have demanded more

18.

Paul Lashmar, Tax Havens Wash Their Hands of Dirty Money; Sanction Threats Have Forced Offshore
Banks to Clean Up Their Act, Independent 5 (Mar 4, 2001).

19.

Id.

20.

Gregg Fields, GOP Asking White House Not to Pursue CaribbeanTax Havens, Miami Herald 1C (Feb

23, 2001).
21.
22.

The Bahamas Charts A New CourseIn InternationalFinance, Mondaq Bus Briefing (Dec 8,2000).
Barry J. Malcolm, Solidifying the Position of the Bahamas as an Outstanding Financial Centre, 7 BFSB

News Briefs 3 (Ocr 2000).
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than anonymity and exceedingly low taxes. In sum, the reforms are a part of an
evolving process independent of the OECD's campaign against harmful tax practices.
V. "AFTER DIRTY AIR, DIRTY MONEY": THE ROLE OF THE US
With a Republican in the White House, critics of the OECD's proposals have
found a more receptive ear. Most notably, Andrew Quinlan of the Center for
Freedom and Prosperity has been active in slowing, if not stopping, the OECD's
efforts. The core arguments against the Framework are that it hampers global tax
competition and limits sovereignty by arrogantly dictating countries' tax policies.
While the campaign against the OECD proposals has been highly successful, the
worries are actually largely unfounded.
The task force set up by the OECD and the Commonwealth is limited to issues
of transparency, non-discrimination, and effective exchange of information. However,
tax rates will be addressed through the non-discrimination principle. As noted in the
Framework, the OECD seeks to eliminate the preferential tax treatment accorded
entities without substantial business presence as compared to their resident
counterparts. In no way does this non-discrimination principle eliminate tax
competition among nations. Rather, it fosters true tax competition by requiring all
countries to utilize tax revenues efficiently in order to provide the services that the
businesses and investors require. The current regime essentially provides the option
to escape tax liability by allowing the creation of faux headquarters while the entity
continues to enjoy the benefits of a higher tax regime residence-benefits such as a
skilled workforce, transportation, stability, and proximity to its markets. Without
some limitation on tax discrimination, corporations and investors would continue to
enjoy the benefits of a high tax regimegratis.
Concerns over limiting sovereignty are, ironically, focused on the wrong side of
the equation. While the OECD has often acted arrogantly in dictating tax reforms,
its main goal is to influence domestic legislation that directly affects OECD member
country interests via consensual trade agreements. It is because the policies of the
named tax havens greatly affect the sovereign right of OECD member countries to tax
their citizens that the OECD has pushed these reforms. Thus it is within the OECD
member nations' sovereign rights to respond to the tax havens' lure by declining to
extend various deductions, exemptions, credits, or other allowances related to
transactions with uncooperative tax havens and imposing transactional charges or
levies on certain transactions involving uncooperative tax havens.
The Clinton administration took a supportive, though not pro-active, role in
advancing the OECD's initiatives. As then Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers
said, "In today's global economy, it is vital that we put an end to international tax
practices that encourage tax evasion and improper tax avoidance and that distort
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capital flows."" Shifting gears, Bush's Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill surprised
senators by suggesting that he could get better and faster results through bilateral
talks rather than by working through the OECD. 4 More to the point, O'Neill laid
out two fundamental principles: enforcing US tax laws and not interfering with the
internal tax policy decisions of sovereign nations. Essentially, O'Neill focused on the
need for countries to be able to obtain upon request specific information from other
countries in order to prevent noncompliance with their tax laws. Free market
principles played an important role in his objectives, as O'Neill made clear when he
added that "it was not in the interest of the United States to stifle tax competition that
forces governments-like businesses-to create efficiencies." 25
VI. THE FUTURE OF TAX HAVENS
Since the Framework, ten countries have signed letters of commitment; others,
like Tonga, have been removed on the basis that they have made significant progress.
However, with the encouragement of the US, tax havens have been more confident in
finding their own way. At the August 2001 Pacific Islands Forum, leaders of sixteen
Pacific countries strongly denounced the OECD's efforts, issuing a communiqu6
questioning the OECD's right to action, and reaffirming the "sovereign right of
nations to establish domestic tax regimes of their own design and choosing." The
communiqu6 nonetheless encourages "the development of a cooperative framework
within which countries can work together to address transparency, capacity building
and appropriate information exchange in relation to tax matters."' 7 Indeed, the leaders
officially welcomed the technical assistance in improving transparency and
information exchange from OECD member Australia."
At the forum, host President Rene Harris of Nauru noted that weaknesses in its
financial system invited danger by essentially granting opportunities to international
criminals. But he would not fully accept the OECD's proposals: "[t]he issue has been
given the title of 'harmful tax competition' by the OECD, but I strongly refute this
and ask the question of who is being harmed&' Answering his own question, he

23.

Mark Battersby, Offshore Tax Havens to Come in From Cold, Investment News 38 (June 26, 2000).

24.
25.

Julie Kesterlitz, The O'NeillEnigma, NatJ 2537 (Aug 11, 2001).
What is the U.S. Position On Offshore Tax Havens.?, Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (July 18,
2001) (statement of Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury).
Thirty-Second Pacific Islands Forum, Republic of Nauru, Forum Communiqu6 para 43 (Aug 1618, 2001), available online at <http://www.forumsec.org.e/docs/fc200l.htm> (visited Sept 30,
2001).
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stated, "I put it to you that the fact that many small island countries choose not to levy
taxes on their people does not harm the people of that [sic] country.""
The existence of offshore financial centers will not end with compromises
stemming from promulgation of the original OECD Framework. Indeed, the very
opposite is likely to happen. Investors will retain many of the legitimate financial
advantages of offshore investing and will gain greater confidence in these investments
as the offshore centers develop greater rules of law. For instance, the president of
Nauru charged that because it was the "victim" of bad publicity, business had
worsened. Hence, he argued that before reforms could be implemented, Nauru
required $10 million compensation for its losses. This reinforces the Bahaman notion
that investors are looking for more than mere anonymity and low taxes. If anonymity
and low taxes were all that investors were seeking the OECD's publicity would have
only helped Nauru's business. In addition, the day that the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering ("FATF") met, Standard & Poors downgraded its rating
for a top Liechtenstein bank."
VII. CONCLUSION

Developed nations, as represented under the umbrella of the OECD, have

legitimate complaints about secrecy and discriminatory tax policies that need to be
addressed. The predatory practices of many Caribbean nations amount to nothing

more than classical, inefficient rent-seeking activities that allow taxpayers to free ride
off their true residences. By addressing the lack of transparency, the developed
nations will be in a better position to tax the worldwide income of their citizens. The
compromised position that resulted from O'Neill's core objectives addresses these
issues yet avoids the appearance of dictating tax rates.
Many of these reforms were set in motion prior to OECD action, driven in part
by the demands of what Thomas Friedman calls the "electronic herd," or a global
market made up of millions of investors." The emergence of financial globalization
initially encouraged international investment in tax havens and is now the force
imposing changes on those regimes. The majority of the electronic herd places a
higher importance on standard accounting and banking regulations than secrecy and
nominal taxes. Bermuda and the Bahamas have been implementing changes
consistent with these demands.
The compliant tax haven nations understand that legitimate investments from
the electronic herd will be more beneficial to their economies in the long run than

29.
30.
31.

Nauru: Excerpts from President's Address in Opening Pacific Summit, BBC \Vorldwide Monitoring (Aug
18,2001).
Wechsler, 80 Foreign Affat 55 (cited in note 6).
Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and tke Olive Tree 94 (Farrar Straus Giroux 1999).
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those of the limited pool of investors seeking high degrees of secrecy and nominal tax
rates. Therefore, regardless of OECD action, it is in these nations' best interest to
adopt internationally accepted accounting and banking principles. As highly affected
nations, the move by the Bahamas and Bermuda toward these standards is a good
indicator that others will follow suit. The carrot of the international investors and the
stick of the developed nations continue to create too powerful a force to ignore.
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